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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

AMERICA'S ARMY IN EUROPE: A NEW FUTURE?

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RAYMOND P. PALUMBO United States Army

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U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

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ABSTRACT

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This paper examines the purpose of our Army in Europe and proposes new ideas for the near-term as we transform to the objective force. Despite significant down sizing after the collapse of the Soviet Union, some critics argue that we still do not have the right Army forces in Europe. They question whether our current structure there is suited to sufficiently meet our nation's strategic security needs and perhaps consumes resources that could be better spent elsewhere. Herein lies the crux of the issue, particularly as we transform the Army to face a future that portends a plethora of unconventional and asymmetric threats to global security. This effort examines the purpose of our Army on the continent vis-à-vis our NATO obligations and proposes an interim organizational concept for the near-term as we transform to the objective force.

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AMERICA'S ARMY IN EUROPE: A NEW FUTURE?

If, we pull back from the world as we transform our armed forces, we will only encourage those who seek to destroy the international order to do so rapidly, before we are ready for them.

- Frederick W. Kagen

As soon as the dust began to settle after the end of the Cold War, pockets of political elite began searching for a peace dividend from the US Defense budget. In short order the dust was kicked up again, this time over the debate to keep a formidable military presence on the continent of Europe, notably a large Army contingent. In many respects – more than a decade later – the dust has not yet settled.

As the world's most powerful nation, the US has been the principal catalyst of social, political, economic, and technological change on a global scale. There is no question that that change has affected the scope and purpose of our Army's force structure in Europe. Nevertheless, some critics argue that we still do not have it right. Does our current force in Europe sufficiently meet our nation's strategic security needs, or is it consuming resources that could be better spent elsewhere? Therein lies the crux of the argument, particularly as we face a challenging future that portends a plethora of unconventional and asymmetric threats to global security. Given the likelihood of these threats becoming reality, what kind of Army forces do we need based on the European continent to secure our strategic security objectives now and in the future? This paper examines the purpose of our Army in Europe and proposes an interim organizational concept for the near-term as we transform to the objective force.

OUT OF THE COLD WAR

If you don't like change, you're going to like irrelevance even less.

- General Eric K. Shinseki

Looking at its performance over the last fifty years, it is no surprise to find virtually unanimous agreement that the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) played a successful role in bringing about the end to the Cold War. In the last decade, however, the notion of grand maneuver by armies on great battlefields has become a relic of the past. From that notion, springs the debate of USAREUR's present and future relevance.

The crumbling of the great Soviet enemy questions the need for a large standing army in Europe to defend against what some contend is a non-existent threat. Coupled with the realities of the information age and rapid advances in technology, the demise of the once formidable Soviet threat may well have relegated warfare – as we once knew it – into the history books forever. Consequently, as the Defense Department's budgets logically declined in the post Cold War era, USAREUR faced two opposing challenges. The first was 'building down the force', a phrase designed to spin a positive light on the adverse affects of the force reduction process. The second, confronted simultaneously with the first, was conducting 'business NOT as usual'. Here again, a play on words suggesting that USAREUR forces could and would be used much differently in the future, perhaps in search for new relevance.

The first challenge was largely an exercise of force sizing. As budgets got smaller, so did the size of the force. Although a relatively straightforward task, great care was taken to ensure we retained the ability to meet requirements of the new post-Cold War National Military Strategy – to fight two major theater wars nearly simultaneously. Of course, some reorganization was necessary within the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command structures. But essentially USAREUR just got smaller in terms of numbers of headquarters, units, and personnel. The second challenge was much more formidable.

Despite its armor-heavy organization and geographic dispersion across the Western European landscape, USAREUR found itself adapting to meet new demands for its forces as it drew down in size. Nearly all of these demands were foreign to its Cold War design and purpose. Some examples include: projecting forces "out of sector" to the Persian Gulf to prosecute the war against Iraq, conducting peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, and responding to a multitude of lesser contingences across the region that did not involve actual combat. Fighting large army-dominated land battles in the post Cold War era seemed less and less likely as the joint force expeditionary style of operations became the norm. Add to this new 'normalcy' a dramatic increase in number, frequency, and variety of events. The 'engagement' component of our national military strategy did much to accelerate the tempo of activity for our Army. Clearly, the list of traditional military operations had grown during the 1990s, but more importantly, so did the number of nontraditional operations. Missions such as Partnership for Peace, nation building, humanitarian assistance, and other variations of 'non-kinetic' activity increased USAREUR's operational tempo to the frenetic pace we see today. The recent events of September 11th, the ongoing operations in Afghanistan, and the widening of the war on global terror serve to

only complicate USAREUR's role in supporting national security objectives. Therefore, if events over the past decade are adequate predictors of the kinds of operations we can expect to encounter in the future, one should expect little debate regarding the need to transform our relic force design into something more apropos.

Today, most would agree that Army Transformation is well underway. The Chief of Staff of the Army's (CSA) vision is clearly communicated, well supported, and widely accepted as a necessary endeavor. The big issue that looms unanswered with respect to USAREUR however remains 'how does Army Transformation affect USAREUR Transformation?' The problem in Europe is not simply a force sizing metric as it has largely been over the past decade. Nor is it merely an organizational design issue that will dovetail nicely with the Army's Transformation Campaign Plan (ATCP). When dealing with overseas-based forces that are parts of a coalition and/or allied effort, the problem becomes much more complex. Our allied partners in Europe are keenly interested in our transformation plans for obvious reasons. How we transform and what we transform to has direct bearing on their own military programs and triggers other political, economic, and diplomatic consequences. The scope of our transformation with respect to USAREUR, therefore, must take into account these broader concerns. We cannot ignore the peculiar considerations that exist in the European Theater, in particular USAREUR's role in the NATO.

Given these broader considerations then, what is the forward-basing construct for our Army that best serves our security objectives in the theater? Perhaps it is first necessary to investigate the overall purpose of US military presence on the continent before embarking on the more specific force posture debate for USAREUR. In the 'big picture' sense, why are we there today? Understanding US strategic interests in Europe is a critical analytical step and fundamental to this study's conclusions.

US INTERESTS IN EUROPE: WHY ARE WE THERE?

We sleep safe in our beds because rough men stand ready in the night to visit violence on those who would do us harm.

- George Orwell

Simply stated, Americans want Europe to remain prosperous, secure and democratic to serve our own global security interests. A safe and secure America depends on the security of our friends and allies around the globe. The US National Security Strategy states that the territorial security of our allies is a vital national interest.¹ Vital is defined as a

fundamental, basic, indispensable, characteristic that is necessary for the maintenance of life.² Therefore, the essence of US interests in Europe is that its "stability is vital to our own security...[and] building a Europe that is truly integrated, democratic, and at peace, would realize a vision that the United States launched more than 50 years ago with the Marshall Plan and NATO."³ The bottom line is that the security of Europe is a vital US national interest and NATO plays an important role in the US-European relationship.

Historically, we have enjoyed long standing economic, political, and cultural ties with Europe. We have fostered an enormous degree of economic interdependence that binds us together and helps spread prosperity around the globe. In a speech at the University of Chicago, General Wesley Clark, then the Supreme Allied Commander Europe characterized the US and European interdependence this way:

Europe buys 30 percent of US exports. Our trade amounts to \$250 billion annually and accounts for over 3 million domestic jobs in the US. Fifty-six percent of our foreign investment occurs in Europe. US companies employ 3 million Europeans. Conversely, European Union (EU) owned companies based in America employ one out of every twelve factory workers. EU companies form the largest investment block in 41 of the 50 US states. Collectively, half of the world's goods are produced by the US and EU. Ninety percent of humanitarian aid dispensed throughout the world comes from the US and EU.

Such statistics clearly underscore the positive contribution that Europe and the US collectively make to the global economy. Given the degree of economic interdependence and considering the common democratic and cultural values we share, it is quite understandable for the US to keep a military presence on the continent to protect its own global interests. During Congressional testimony in 2001, General Thomas Schwartz, the Commander in Chief of US Forces in Korea sums up the strategic value of forward-based Army forces best. He states, "It is [the] physical, not virtual, US presence that brings peace of mind to the democratic nations of the region, and provides tangible deterrence." General Schwartz's advocacy that physical presence is key to deterrence reflects the same sentiment espoused by our allies on the European continent.

Our allies continue to argue for a strong US presence for a variety of reasons. They agree that democratic values flourish best in peaceful, stable environments and are eager to have us share the burden in helping to maintain Europe's security. They are willing recipients of our leadership as well as our military investment. This brings to light, however, the argument of burden sharing among NATO partners. How much US military presence is necessary to protect our own security interests versus how much should we be willing to

spend for collective security? What should our contribution be to garner the peace and stability on the continent vis-à-vis contributions by our European allies? If the premise of US Army forces in Europe is accepted as essential to secure vital US interests, then the issue of burden sharing between the NATO partners sits at center stage.

THE DEBATE

There are two times in a man's life when he should not speculate: when he can't afford it, and when he can.

- Mark Twain

THE ANTAGONIST VIEW

As one would reasonably expect, some critics argue that the level of today's permanently based force in Europe is overkill. In short, the antagonists feel that the policy (ways) is wrong and that we can more appropriately contribute to a secure, economically prosperous, and democratic Europe (ends) without such a large military presence (means). According to Mr. Donald Bandler, Special Assistant to former President Clinton, we are "still seen as the hegemon in global affairs, which is not in the interests of the US. The US seeks a more balanced partnership with Europe, which is the reason for the existence of the NATO alliance." The antagonists' concerns are that the degree of military meddling in European security affairs is too great and that the European states should bear more responsibility for their own destiny. Said another way, the US may be shouldering too much of Europe's security burden without reaping an appropriate dividend on our investment. Commenting on the US role in Kosovo for example, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger remarked, "European states should be able to manage that kind of problem, or problems of that magnitude, on their own." Kissinger's isolationist statement underscores the sentiment that we may tend to coddle the Europeans to the point that they will be unable, or perhaps unwilling, to go it alone should the need arise.

Others in this camp agree that this coddling may draw us into conflicts that perhaps we should not get into. Suggesting that we may have too much of a NATO-centered policy, Dr. Ted Carpenter, of the Cato Institute in Washington, DC opines that our NATO allies underinvest in their own defense and compensate for it by free-riding on the security guarantee provided by the United States.⁸ Our policy, therefore, may be unnecessarily wasteful in terms of defense resources and that those resources could be better spent elsewhere. Gary Dempsey, another foreign policy expert at Cato recently wrote that NATO's "defense

spending and military capabilities are presently out of sync with their professed goal.

Several European nations, in fact, spend less than half – in terms of a percentage of GDP – of what the United States spends on defense."9

There is another dimension of this argument worth mentioning. Critics from the free-ride camp offer that we may be setting ourselves up for long-term problems by staying involved in conflicts that really do not directly impact our vital security interests. The most notable examples are Bosnia and Kosovo. They claim that continuing such long-term follies could stretch our military too thin, particularly during times of constrained defense budgets and economic recession as we see today. In the end, we may be accepting unnecessary risk and over-stressing our readiness, possibly to the point of being unable to effectively respond when truly vital interests are threatened.

THE PROTAGONIST VIEW

On the other side of the argument lies a strong stable of allied and domestic support in favor of a robust forward-based military. These critics claim that our military presence in Europe is a peace enabler and fundamental to US national security. Without forward-based units, we would be hard pressed diplomatically to influence or react to events in the region. The military element of national power used in conjunction with the political, diplomatic, and economic elements enhances our ability to operate in a variety of ways. From a deterrence perspective alone, the mere fact that we station credible and ready forces in Europe deters potential enemies from acting against us. Nothing demonstrates a nation's will better than the real and credible physical presence of sons and daughters in another sovereign's territory.

To withdraw or reduce our presence puts us at a disadvantage by sending the wrong signals to our allies. But more importantly, withdrawal sends the same clear message to our would-be enemies. Retraction of any sort signals to potential aggressors that they may be unopposed in their own efforts. This may make it appealing for them to use force of arms as the preferred course of action to achieve their goals. Lastly, protagonists forcefully argue that disengagement from Europe would lessen our ability to stay tuned to the happenings in the region, and make it more difficult to operate there should a future need arise.

NATO CONSIDERATIONS

The US force structure we see on the continent today is the product of five decades of careful diplomacy with our allies. The US military contribution to NATO is just that – a contribution. It is our piece in a larger whole. Adjustments to our contribution heretofore have been carefully balanced against the aggregate capabilities of the other allies. During the height of the Cold War, the calculus of NATO's required capability was straightforward and arguably quantifiable. The threat was well understood. It changed very slowly and when it did, it did so in small increments. The absence of our old Soviet adversary today makes the calculus much less quantifiable and consequently more complex. Recognizing that the original purpose of NATO was to defend against an attack by the Soviet Union — a purpose that is no longer valid — the relevance of NATO itself is in question. Nevertheless, as the alliance marches forward in this multi-polar void that was once filled by the Soviet Union, we face the challenge of managing risk between new and uncertain dangers and the temptation to draw down the alliance too far. The one stabilizing factor in the alliance that has remained constant since the end of World War Two, however, has been US leadership.

There are strong arguments that any further US disengagement on the continent could potentially weaken our leadership in the alliance at a critical point in its post Cold War development. Protagonists for a robust military presence cite that as the recognized leader, we stand favorably positioned to influence the direction the alliance takes to better accommodate our own security interests. Were we to signal at this decisive time a disinterest in NATO's future by withdrawing appreciable numbers of forces and/or headquarters from the continent, we could lose influence in shaping the alliance's destiny. Significant issues such as missile defense and the ABM Treaty, as well as NATO enlargement, have monumental implications for NATO's future. More importantly, to disengage now reduces our ability to influence NATO's management of Russian weakness at a time when Russia's fledgling experiment with democracy is itself at a crossroads. A democratically healthy and economically productive Russia that is friendly towards the west is clearly in our best security interests, particularly as we embark on the long-term fight against world terror.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF SEPTEMBER 11TH

It would be imprudent to ignore the events of September 11th in this analysis. The terror strikes of that day will be remembered much like the sinking of the Lusitania and the bombing of Pearl Harbor. They mark a defining moment for our military posture around the

globe. Not only did September 11th directly affect future US force design and posturing abroad, it opened the European security accounts that we paid into for five decades. In the post-Soviet era, the prevailing thought has been that our investment in the security of our European allies has reaped only modest and somewhat intangible dividends. Since September 11th, however, we have clearly witnessed concrete "withdrawals" on that investment. For example, US taxpayers now see and can readily appreciate the benefits of our participation in events such as Bosnia and Kosovo. We steadfastly supported our allies and coalition partners despite heated argument at home over whether or not peace in the Balkans was in our vital national interests. Today we enjoy well-earned returns for that unwavering support.

Since September 11th, our NATO allies have reciprocated in a real and measurable way with complete loyalty, support, and commitment. When the time came for us to cash in on our investment in exchange for support to fight world terror, our allies didn't blink. NATO quickly responded by invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty claiming "an armed attack against one or more of them [allies] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." To date we have received remarkable cooperation in the campaign against terrorism, particularly in the diplomatic, banking, and law enforcement arenas. In addition to providing selective combat forces and logistical aid, our allies have permitted the widespread use of bases and airspace. These are benefits that are indeed critical today, but will be crucial requirements as we transform our forces for the future. The bottom line is that our NATO allies stand by us now for good reason. To assume they will continue to stand by us if we disengage on the continent would undermine our own security objectives in the region and beyond.

THE RUSSIA FACTOR

The events of September 11th have likewise sparked a warming of US-Russian relations. With world terror as a common enemy, we have leveraged the crisis to foster a promising diplomatic environment. Strategically daunting issues such as missile defense, the ABM Treaty, and NATO enlargement, now tend toward amicability. At the operational level, Russia has been instrumental in helping us procure the use of bases and airspace in several of the Former Soviet States to prosecute operations in Afghanistan. But the most compelling stakes with respect to Russia lie in the security of its formidable nuclear, biological, and chemical arsenals. In the words of former US Senator Howard Baker, "the most urgent unmet national security threat to the US today is the danger that weapons of

mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nations and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home."¹¹ Such chilling possibilities intimate that now is not the time to ignore a fledgling Russia. We must pursue – in the short term – a policy of close cooperation to help the Russian military secure its formidable nuclear arsenal. Likewise, we must use our relationship with Russia to prevent the transfer of nuclear materiel or technical assistance from other former Soviet states to terrorist entities or rogue nations. Such transfer can be mitigated through closer cooperation between our governments, particularly our militaries. Military-to-military engagement programs could pay huge dividends in achieving such a goal; and USAREUR would be an excellent diplomatic tool in facilitating such an important endeavor.

Another near-term endeavor that Russian cooperation can help manage concerns the disingenuous economic practices that permeate the other former Soviet states. One example that has direct bearing on the war against global terror is the situation in Belarus. Belarus is accused of being "a leading supplier of lethal military equipment to Islamic radicals – with terrorists and militant organizations in the Middle East, Balkans, and Central Asia often the recipients." This is clearly a situation that we must address as part of a broad-based effort to curb the proliferation of arms in the hands of our would-be aggressors. Russia is in the best diplomatic position to help us address this problem. Additionally, it has powerful cultural and economic ties to its former Soviet neighbors that could prove helpful in this endeavor. As our spirit of cooperation improves, the Russian government will play an ever-increasing role in achieving long-term stability in and among the former Soviet states and the region as a whole.

In a statement during a joint press conference with President Putin in early October, the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, captures the essence of how the war on terror has affected the long-term relationship between the US and NATO, and Russia. His comments signal a fundamental shift in cooperation from what has been characterized over the last five decades as an unpropitious relationship:

For some 40 years NATO and Russia sat and glowered at each other. For another 10 years we tiptoed around each other but now I believe that we are entering an era where substantial and practical cooperation is going to build a unique relationship between us... The attack at the heart of the United States on 11 September 2001 was not just an attack on the United States and members of NATO; it was an attack on the values that unite Russia with the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance. That must make all of us more committed to acting decisively against those who bring such wanton and reckless violence into the heart of any civilized city. ¹³

President Putin's retort signaled reciprocal sentiment, opening the door for agreement on NATO enlargement, missile defense, the democratization of Russia and other mutual concerns. Putin stated, "the changes in the attitude and in the outlook of all the Western partners...are moving things toward qualitative changes in our [collective] relationship... We are ready for this." His words indicate a future ripe with collegial possibilities. We could well be entering a new era of cooperation, one with a genuine willingness for positive change and one that portends enormous opportunities to improve stability in the region. Diplomatic and political engagement of Russia through NATO, therefore, becomes increasingly appealing as a vehicle to achieve US global security interests vis-à-vis stronger NATO-Russo ties. USAREUR, as a significant US contribution to NATO land forces, will play a critical role in military engagement programs designed to improve, and in some cases build from scratch, NATO-Russo relations.

CONCLUSIVE LINKS

The above analysis aptly addresses why keeping permanently based military forces on the continent of Europe is in our national interests. The foundation of our global security posture has roots in the political and economic stability of Europe. NATO, the glue that binds the US to our European partners and protects our mutual security, is in a state of uncertainty. Throughout its history, the US has been the recognized leader of NATO. The alliance looks to the US today for continued leadership to successfully guide it through these uncertain times. NATO's destiny affects two significant US security challenges: managing the threats posed by a fragile Russia and other former Soviet states; and fighting the war against global terror. Therefore, the US military contribution to NATO today may remain as compelling as it was during the Cold War. The bottom line is that our global security is clearly linked to forces on the ground in Europe.

But the question of 'how much' remains yet unanswered. Fortunately, to address this issue, we will not have to start with a clean slate. Our current military force structure serves as a good point of departure for our analysis. It is a fully engaged force working around the clock, yet a mere remnant of the force that had served our national interests well through two world wars, the Cold War, and Desert Storm. Although it remains a formidable force today by any measure, will it be the right force for the future?

THE NATURE OF TODAY'S FORCES IN EUROPE

It was once said that the only thing more difficult than fighting alone is fighting in a coalition. But fighting in a coalition is far superior to fighting alone. I never really understood that until I became a NATO commander.

- General Crosbie E. Saint

THE SHAPING OF USEUCOM

During the twentieth century, history has recorded three major iterations of US military build-up on the European continent. Each of these was followed by a corresponding demobilization and retrenchment back across the Atlantic. The most recent dismantling started during the first Bush administration as the new world order began to take shape. Again, the familiar argument of guns versus butter erupted. As mentioned earlier, NATO members' military budgets and force structure began to decline (see Figure 1, NATO Defense Expenditures). These reductions spawned considerable debate on both sides of the Atlantic as the US and our NATO allies sharply cut defense programs. Consequently, a variety of conflicting agendas came to the fore as engines driving US policy formulation.

	1990	1995	1998	1990-199 % Chang
Belgium	4.9	3.6	3.6	-26.9
Canada	10.5	9.0	7.1	-32.7
Denmark	2.8	2.7	2.8	-3.3
France	44.1	40.6	39.2	-11.1
Germany	46.1	33.3	31.9	-30.7
Greece	4.5	4.5	5.4	20.9
Italy	25.5	22.4	22.4	-12.1
Luxembourg	0.1	0.1	0.1	32.2
Netherlands	7.8	6.6	6.5	-16.4
Norway	3.3	3.0	3.2	-3.7
Portugal	2.3	2.3	2.3	1.2
Spain	8.4	7.6	7.2	-14.7
Turkey	6.1	7.1	8.0	30.6
United States	379.2	297.9	269.8	-28.9
United Kingdom	51.3	39.3	37.1	-27.7

FIGURE 1. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

Clearly, eight years of the Clinton administration's domestically focused agenda helped define the size, scope and purpose of today's US force composition in Europe. But

other dynamics certainly impacted our presence there. Issues such as the relevance of a post Cold War NATO, multiple crises in the Balkans and Middle East, contingencies in Africa, and the Greece-Turkey standoff in Cyprus are just a few examples that shaped our military on the continent. Perhaps the most compelling issue remains the stability of the former Soviet states, in particular Russia and the security of its formidable chemical, nuclear, and biological arsenals. If it were not for these complex and interrelated regional challenges, as well as a myriad of lesser social, political, and economic issues, we might well be looking at far fewer American troops in Europe than we see today – certainly a much smaller Army. Nevertheless, the force we see today is an outgrowth of the regional dynamics that have shaped it.

USEUCOM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO

The number and compliment of permanent based US forces have changed significantly from the height of the Cold War. Today we maintain approximately 8 percent of our total active military force numbering 116,400 soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines in the region as part of the United States European Command (USEUCOM).¹⁶ Figure 2 shows the structure of USEUCOM and its relationship with NATO.¹⁷ Forces assigned to USEUCOM constitute a significant contribution to NATO's overall force structure.




FIGURE 2. US EUROPEAN COMMAND

USEUCOM's mission is to "maintain ready forces to conduct the full spectrum of military operations unilaterally or in concert with the coalition partners; to enhance transatlantic security through support to NATO; to promote regional stability; and advance US interests in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East." This mission presents two fundamental questions that must be considered in the force posture debate. First, what forces are necessary to satisfy our treaty obligations with NATO? And second, what capability do we want forward-based in the theater to prosecute unilateral action without regard to NATO requirements? The answer to both questions could be substantially different depending on our security objectives. In a political sense, as long as our government intends to comply with the North Atlantic Treaty, we must maintain no less than the military capability required to satisfy our obligations. The key issue concerning USAREUR force composition becomes 'will our contribution to NATO provide acceptable capacity to address US unilateral requirements?' Should the answer be yes, we have just identified the minimum required force capability. The unilateral force equals the NATO force. But if the answer is no, what additional capability must we add to prosecute US unilateral action? To determine the solution, we must first analyze USAREUR's requirements in NATO.

USAREUR'S INTEGRATION WITH NATO

USAREUR forces today are extensively integrated with NATO at various levels of command. Because of this simple fact, any initiatives to resize, reshape, or realign our land force contribution to NATO would be a significant political and diplomatic endeavor. At the 4-star Army level, the commanding general (CG) of USAREUR functions as the commander of NATO's Joint Sub-Regional Command-Centre on a rotational basis with Germany. At the 3-star Corps level, the US provides division sized forces in two ways. Under the provisions of Article 5 of the treaty, the US contributes a reinforced armored division to the standing Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), commanded by a British 3-star general. Also under Article 5 as part of the NATO main defense force, the CG of V (US) Corps serves the dual role as the CG of NATO's V (US-GE) Corps, a combined force having two heavy US divisions and one heavy Germany division. In a reciprocal arrangement, a German corps commander is the CG of the II (GE-US) Corps having two German divisions and one US division. The above description of headquarters integration merely begins to illustrate the commingling of USAREUR with NATO land forces. A full plate of engagement activity such as Military-to-Military contacts, the Partnership for Peace program, Foreign

Exchanges, Security Assistance and Exercise Programs, and Arms Control requirements, to illustrate only a few examples, makes any US restructuring effort a very complicated and significant undertaking. The complexity only increases when one considers the changing nature of today's alliance and ongoing non-Article 5 activities. In the non-Article 5 arena, USAREUR supports NATO peace operations in the Balkans on a full-time basis. In its Theater Army role as prescribed by United States Code, Title 10, USAREUR supports US forces deployed to Bosnia as part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR), and to Serbia as part of Kosovo Forces (KFOR). It provides a divisional-sized headquarters element to SFOR and KFOR on a rotational basis with CONUS forces. It also provides routine combat, combat support, and combat service support slices.

Given the aforementioned organizational integration and the high operations tempo among USAREUR and NATO component commands, it is obvious that any effort to reduce, realign, or restructure US forces will clearly be a major political and diplomatic undertaking. Such efforts in the past have habitually been met with great debate and consternation on the part of our allies. It is precisely that reaction – the reality of multilateral action – which calls for the US to maintain the capability to prosecute unilateral military action in the region.

Why is it in our best interest to have a force capable of unilateral action beyond NATO? Two recent events serve as a poignant illustration. Operation Allied Force, the NATO bombing campaign to oust the Serbian Army from Kosovo in 1999, proved how difficult multilateral military operations could be. The gross political tampering at the operational and tactical levels by our allies' heads of state, to the point of approving or disapproving individual targets, interfered with the jobs of our combatant commanders. The resulting chaos and confusion was etched in the memories of US commanders. When the time came to prosecute military action in Afghanistan after September 11th, despite NATO's invocation of Article 5, the US chose to operate outside the NATO command structure to avoid repeating the operational paralysis exhibited in Kosovo. It is important to note, however, that having both unilateral and multilateral military options available to policy makers is clearly in the best interest of US national security. For this reason, it is imperative for USAREUR force design to satisfy both approaches. So how should USAREUR transform to better meet our treaty obligations in NATO as well as satisfy future unilateral operations? The answer lies in the pursuit of 'jointness'.

TRANSFORMING FOR THE FUTURE

Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort.

- General Dwight D. Eisenhower

THE USAREUR OF TODAY

Down in its overall number of tactical headquarters from the height of the Cold War, the USAREUR of today has COCOM over eleven subordinate commands. It also has ADCON of FORSCOM units rotating through the Balkans (see Figure 3). The command's assigned personnel end-strength stands at roughly 62 thousand soldiers, supported by 11 thousand civilians and approximately 16 thousand host nation employees. Although its end-strength represents only 13 percent of the total Army, it supports approximately 48 percent of the Army's deployed forces outside the United States.¹⁹




FIGURE 3. USAREUR ORGANIZATION²⁰

USAREUR's mission statement and mission essential task list (Figure 4) indicate a fundamental shift from the Cold War mentality of the past. It clearly reflects the theme of Joint Vision 2020 to be "dominant across the full spectrum of military operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict." Further, the QDR 2001 specifically calls for the US to maintain its critical bases in Western Europe to serve in

the role of hubs for power projection in future contingencies in other areas of the world.²² Such an endeavor, however, does not happen overnight. As with any large bureaucratic organization, changing the momentum of the Cold War mentality has been difficult. For a variety of reasons, European politics notwithstanding, transforming the 'defend in place' mindset has been slow despite the obvious need and clear imperative to do so. Only over the last several years has USAREUR's senior leadership vigorously embraced the new Joint and Army visions and started pushing hard to move the command in that direction.

MISSION

USAREUR maintains a forward-deployed combat force, trained and ready; prepared for immediate power projection in order to conduct and support the full spectrum of joint and multinational operations; conducts engagement activities, protects U.S. forces and resources, conducts sustaining base operations and ensures the readiness and well being of its personnel, in the theater, or elsewhere as directed.

MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST

- Provide and sustain trained and ready forces.
- o Protect the force.
- o Promote regional stability.
- Gain and maintain information dominance.
- Conduct theater power projection operations (deployment & reception, staging onward movement & integration (RSOI)).
- o Operate a strategic sustainment base.

FIGURE 4. USAREUR MISSION AND METL²³

USAREUR AND THE ATCP

The Army Transformation Campaign Plan (ATCP) is clearly the right blueprint to achieve the imperatives of JV2020. In fact, its ultimate goal of building a force for the fourth decade of this new century fills a visionary void that has been lacking in the Army for over ten years. General Shinseki's strategic guidance, crafted into the ACTP, has essentially become a comprehensive roadmap for the future. Yet some critics underestimate the scope of the plan and mistakenly think its focus is only on major end items of equipment such as

the Future Combat Systems. But in reality, Army transformation covers all aspects of the corporate Army (doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, soldiers, information, and more). Despite getting off to a slow start initially, the ATCP now enjoys broad support by the new administration, senior civilians in DoD, key members of Congress, and the other services. There is little doubt that it charts the proper course to get the Army in step with evolving joint doctrine and where we need to be in 2031 and beyond.

But the ATCP is not without weakness. The architecture of the plan is sound, but the manner in which it is being implemented may be amiss. With respect to USAREUR specifically, the weakness in the implementation of the ATCP pertains to misplaced 'emphasis and resource apportionment'. Just as USAREUR's relationship with NATO demanded unique consideration in the post Cold War draw down, so too must USAREUR receive special consideration in the implementation of the ACTP. Said another way, the application of resources along the three axes to the objective force may merit different priority in USAREUR than in the rest of the Army to truly meet our national security objectives (see Figure 5, The Army Transformation Strategy).




FIGURE 5. ARMY TRANSFORMATION STRATEGY24

For overall transformation to succeed, the Army must properly apply constrained resources across all three axes (legacy, interim, and objective). The Army's primary emphasis today is focused on the interim and objective paths. For operational and fiscal reasons, our investment in the legacy force is understandably lean. The intent is to 'just get

by' with current systems, retain operational overmatch of our adversaries, and press forward to build new generations of weapon systems that are akin to the evolving joint doctrine of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO). This approach is particularly evident in USAREUR, but should be a cause for alarm. The legacy force is all that USAREUR has to address the threats of today. Is today's force suitable? Some critics contend we are not. They use examples such as our slow deployment to Kosovo to support their argument. Moreover, what if a situation involving future or forecasted threats gets here before the Army and/or USAREUR transforms? Certainly there is much that USAREUR can do now with the current force to better meet US unilateral and NATO multilateral needs while Army transformation continues.

USAREUR: A PROPOSED NEW LOOK

Don't tell me what it was designed to do...tell me what it can do.

- From the movie Apollo 13

Despite impressive efforts to change from its Cold War mindset, USAREUR remains a predominately heavy-oriented force – both physically and mentally. We must do better. The leadership that USAREUR attracts, the nature of operations it expects to conduct, the training it does, the way it supports the force, the equipment it uses, the way the command is organized - virtually all aspects of DTLOMS - remains oriented toward the heavy fight. Physically, although USAREUR units can shoot, move, and communicate as well as any other unit in the Army; they still can't get to the fight quickly enough. In terms of power projection capability, the command is not appreciably better than it was in 1999 when it demonstrated how ill suited it was at projecting combat forces to Albania for Operation Allied Force. Mentally, USAREUR has yet to completely shake the grasp of the Cold War psyche. Jargon such as "Central Region" and "out of sector operations" continues to permeate the vernacular in key guidance documents and in statements made by leaders who spent most of their careers manning defensive positions along the Inner German Border (IGB). We must break this mold. And we can do most of the job with today's force structure while we shoulder forward with the ATCP.

It is important at this point to consider guidance spelled out in the new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Although the QDR fundamentally reinforces the Army's transformation strategy, it adds some specific guidance that will require Army leaders to re-

think the application of resources with respect to USAREUR. As we begin to analyze the pertinent QDR guidance, it is important to consider the potential affects of a revised Unified Command Plan (UCP) as well. Although the publication of the next UCP has been delayed because of September 11th, the QDR calls for a reevaluation of the UCP in light of homeland defense issues. Significant changes in the UCP could affect the command arrangements of EUCOM and its components. However, the new QDR also states that the "presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of US commitment to allies and friends...[and]...The nation will honor its obligations and will be a reliable security partner."²⁵ Because of these words and our six decades of commitment to NATO, it is unlikely that a revised UCP will bear measurable affect on our support to the alliance.

As mentioned earlier, given that the CG, USAREUR functions as commander of NATO's Joint Sub-Regional Command-Centre, it would be politically and diplomatically difficult to change our Army level integration with NATO in the near term. Therefore, it is prudent then for the US to continue to show its resolve in NATO, assure its allies, and dissuade potential enemies by keeping a 4-star Army headquarters permanently stationed on the continent. Any UCP changes sparked by the events of September 11th should not change USAREUR's current status or position in NATO, nor should it affect USAREUR as the Army service component command in the region. Logically then, USAREUR will continue its USC, Title 10 role as the US theater army and as such, continue to support ongoing operations in the Balkans and future operations elsewhere in the area of responsibility (AOR). Of particular note: although keeping a 4-star Army headquarters in USAREUR would differ from the rank of commanders in other forward-based Army headquarters [the Eighth US Army and the US Army Pacific are both commanded by Lieutenant Generals, and US Army South is commanded by a Major General] our leadership position in NATO requires such an investment.

Next, the notion of deterring forward is emphasized in the QDR, but is something that is not clearly emphasized in the ATCP. This disconnect indicates the need to readdress how the Army apportions resources across the legacy and interim axes of transformation. The QDR describes a paradigm shift in our force planning that specifically "calls for maintaining regionally tailored forces forward stationed in Europe." Additionally, it states "US forces will fight from a forward deterrent posture with immediately employable forces." Although these words add emphasis to the fundamental goals of transformation – building a force that is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable – this

new guidance reorients focus to include forward-based units. This runs contrary to how the Army envisioned applying 'emphasis and resources' across the ATCP which was heretofore oriented towards CONUS based forces; it will now require reevaluation.

During a lecture to the Army War College Class of 2002 post September 11th, a senior Army leader indicated that despite the new war on terror and a potential increase in the defense budget, USAREUR could lose up to a corps headquarters, a heavy division, and about 7 thousand troops from its present end-strength.²⁸ This is a surprising initiative given the present mission demands in the theater. Nevertheless, it may present a unique opportunity for the Army to contribute significantly to our national security objectives and at the same time accelerate our transformation. Given the frequent accusations by many critics that the USAREUR command structure is unnecessarily top-heavy, now may be the time to aggressively follow the DoD guidance and structurally downsize in Europe.

Setting aside our role in NATO for the moment, and observing the USAREUR command structure from a US unilateral perspective (refer to figure 3), having an Army and Corps headquarters for the present number of assigned US forces is arguably overkill. Nevertheless, the QDR specifies a "goal to establish standing joint task force (SJTF) headquarters in each of the regional combatant commands." These forward SJTFs are to be sufficiently "capable of swiftly defeating an adversary's military and political objectives with only modest reinforcement." Given this guidance, a prudent option for USAREUR may be to stand down V Corps Headquarters but retain appropriate force structure to become the genesis of the future SJTF headquarters assigned to EUCOM. The US Air Force has already got a jump on what could potentially function as the air component of such a force. General Jumper, the Air Force Chief of Staff is presently organizing what he terms a "Global Response Task Force that could include strike aircraft on alert at deployed locations ... ready to respond to things that emerge and ready to go beyond [regional combatant commander] boundaries, if required."

This is exactly what the Army envisions in the ATCP and can begin to reorganize its forces within Europe to move in that direction in the near term. The number of personnel for the Army contribution to the new joint headquarters would be significantly less than a fully manned heavy-Corps headquarters. The residual spaces could be used for other Army transformation initiatives, particularly in USAREUR as described below. Although this endeavor could be politically delicate with NATO, a logical case could be made with our allies for this new SJTF headquarters to retain the same dual-hat function as V (US) Corps presently has in the NATO land force structure.

Assuming the above as possible, we can now turn to the QDR's call for "new combinations of immediately employable forward stationed and deployed forces [that] must possess a wide range of offensive and defensive capabilities that can achieve strategic and operational objectives in the face of determined adversaries."32 It is possible to reengineer the V Corps headquarters into the genesis of a fully operable SJTF headquarters with assigned air, sea, land and special operations functional components. We could immediately begin a multi-year plan to build a broad mix of ARFOR component forces for the SJTF. These should include in-theater heavy, medium, and light forces, as well as supporting forces normally found in a corps support base. Most of these units currently reside in USAREUR. The QDR calls for an IBCT to be stationed in Europe by 2007³³ facilitating USAREUR's ability to make available a medium weight ARFOR capability, something not resident today. Another feature made possible by the potential loss of one heavy division would be to use assets from the eliminated division to round up the remaining heavy division to three fully manned and equipped heavy brigades (C1 on equipment and personnel). Lastly, to complete the optimum array of heavy, medium, light and SOF force mix, it would be prudent to round out SETAF's infantry brigade to three full-up airborne battalions and retain SETAF HQs to function as a "surge" JTF headquarters or ARFOR headquarters. Such a SJTF force construct would truly provide EUCOM and NATO the flexibility to decisively respond across the range of operations that the QDR calls for.

CONCLUSION

The US requires a broad mix of military capabilities to effectively serve its global security interests. Applied in conjunction with the other elements of national power, the military element continues to function principally as a deterrent force. Should deterrence fail, however, the military must be strategically responsive and able to dominate any adversary across the full range of operations. Land forces, without question, comprise a necessary and critical element of the required force mix. Current ground operations in the mountains of Afghanistan underscore the need for such a broad mix of land forces. Air helped set the conditions for success, but ultimately ground troops were essential to complete the task of the joint force commander.

No one can predict with certainty where and when future conflicts will occur, nor their scope or duration. Nor can anyone reasonably predict what type of military forces we will need to successfully prosecute every conflict. Therefore we must be ready to deter and defeat a broad range of threats. And we must be able to do this across the

globe, either multilaterally or unilaterally. It is this uncertain environment that requires us to be proactive and engage abroad, to keep our friends close, and our enemies even closer.

USAREUR – as an integral part of NATO – is a vital part of this engagement strategy. The fact that we station troops on our NATO allies' soil serves to assure them of US resolve to help guarantee their own security. USAREUR has served this purpose for over a half a century and will remain a key element of our national security strategy for the foreseeable future. USAREUR should be there as long as NATO is there. Yet the nature of Army force structure needed to assure our allies is more symbolic than it is practical for military purposes. The drivers to determine what type of land force we should station on the continent of Europe should be largely defined by unilateral considerations based upon current and projected military requirements. The organization of our force there today is out of balance for unilateral requirements. It is too heavy and therefore ill-suited as a power-projection force to meet future requirements. The ATCP promises to methodically transform the existing force into one that will meet such requirements over the next several decades. But what if the future gets here first and the need for transformed forces, as was seen in Kosovo (1999), occurs before they are available?

Although there is much we can do with the current force to improve our posture in the near term, the need to change is now. We have the people, the equipment, the knowledge, the technology – and the timing is right – to reorganize into a much more capable force. Prior to September 11th, there was little chance of harnessing the necessary political and financial support to succeed in such a venture. The terrorist attacks on our homeland have opened a window of opportunity to facilitate the necessary support. Now is the time to change USAREUR into the force it needs to be in the near term as we transform to the objective force solution of the future.

WORD COUNT = 8260

ENDNOTES

- ¹ William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century</u>, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, December, 2000), 4.
- ² "Vital," <u>The Merriam-Webster Pocket Dictionary</u>, (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1978), 774.
 - ³ Clinton, 39.
- ⁴ The level of economic interdependence between the US and Europe is keenly illustrated in the words of General Wesley Clark, then the SACEUR and keynote speaker of a symposium held at the University of Chicago on August 4, 1999. The symposium brought together informed minds in academia and government to debate the future presence of our military in Europe. Key presentations during the symposium are captured in Lloyd J. Matthews, ed., <u>The Future of the American Presence in Europe</u>. (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 13.
- ⁵ Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, <u>U.S. Senator John Warner</u> (Rep-VA) Holds Hearing on Status of U.S. Military Forces, 27 March 2001, available from Academic Universe, Lexis-Nexis, Accessed 15 January 2002.
- ⁶ Donald Bandler, "US Policy for the New Europe, Secretary's Open Forum," 6 April 1999; available from http://www.state.gov/www/dept/openforum/proceedings/apr6-99/europe/html; Internet; accessed 19 December 2001.
- ⁷ Dr. Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State, is quoted by Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter during his remarks at the University of Chicago symposium noted above. See Matthews, 47.
 - ⁸ Ibid. 47.
- ⁹ Gary Dempsey, "Passing The Baton In The Balkans," <u>Washington Times</u>, 10 January 2002, 15.
- ¹⁰ The North Atlantic Treaty, (Washington, D.C.:4 April 1949); Available from http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm; Internet; accessed 11 January 2002.
- ¹¹ A direct link between the questionable security of former Soviet nuclear material, the growing demand for such material on the black market, and the threats posed to the US by global terrorism is characterized in this quote by former US Senator Howard Baker in John Huges, "Why It's Vital to Help Russia Guard Nuclear Stockpiles," https://ca.dtic.nuk/cgi-bin/ebird.cgi?docurl=/Jan2002/220020102vital.htm; Internet; accessed 2 Jan 2002.
- ¹² Mark Lenzi, "Europe's Armory For Terrorism," <u>Washington Post</u>, 3 January 2002, 17.

¹³ Excerpts of a speech made by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson pertaining to the warming of NATO-Russian relations are quoted in an article by Alexander Gerry, COL, AUS (Ret), "War Against Terrorism: Radical Departure for NATO", <u>ROA National Security Report</u>, (Washington, D.C.: Reserve Officer's Association, November 2001), 28.

- ¹⁵ The data contained in this table are designed to show the decreasing fiscal contributions of our NATO partners since the end of the Cold War. The table is found in The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Overview on Budget, Dated 1 March 2000, Available from http://www.periscope.ucg.com/docs/nations/nato/nato/organzn/index.html, Internet; accessed 8 March 2002.
- ¹⁶ <u>United States European Command Home Page Main Frame</u>; Available from http://www.eucom.mil.html; Internet; accessed 9 October 2001.
- ¹⁷ National Defense University, Joint Forces Staff College, <u>The Joint Staff</u> Officer's Guide 2000, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office), 1-34.
- ¹⁸ Both the unilateral and collective purposes of US forces stationed in Europe are spelled out in the European Command's mission statement found on the United States European Command Home Page Main Frame.
- ¹⁹ The Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) of USAREUR is illustrated in this enlightening statistic showing a comparison between the Army at large and USAREUR. General Montgomery C. Meigs, "US Army Europe: On Point for the Nation," <u>Army Magazine</u>, October 2001, 75-76.
- ²⁰ This unclassified chart shows the present organization of USAREUR. It depicts the major subordinate commands that are permanently assigned and those temporary units placed under ADCON as they rotate through the Balkans. The information was derived from a USAREUR command briefing entitled "US Army Europe: On Point for the Nation". The briefing may be found on the <u>United States Army Europe and 7th Army Home Page</u>; Available from http://192.74.126.1:8105; SIPRNET; accessed 12 January 2002.
- ²¹ General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Joint Vision</u> <u>2020</u>, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, June 2000), 1.
- ²² Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, <u>Quadrennial Defense Review Report</u>, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 27.

¹⁴ Ibid, 28.

²³ Meigs.

²⁴ Dennis Steel, "The Army Magazine Hooah Guide to Army Transformation," <u>Army Magazine</u>, February 2001, 26.

²⁵ Rumsfeld, 11.

- ²⁶ Ibid, 20.
- ²⁷ Ibid, 26.
- ²⁸ In keeping with the spirit of the 'non-attribution policy' at the US Army War College, the name of this senior Army leader and the date of this revelation are omitted to protect his identity. Nevertheless, the substance of his comment is germane to the argument advanced in this study.
 - ²⁹ Rumsfeld, 33-34.
 - ³⁰ Ibid, 25.
- ³¹ Elaine M. Grossmann, "Air Force To Build Task Force for Global Terror, Other Missions," <u>Inside the Pentagon</u>, 31 January 2002, 1.
 - ³² Rumsfeld, 25.
 - ³³ Ibid, 27.

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